Operation Nomad-Polar
By Merry Helm, Writers Guild of America, February 1, 2007
Operation Nomad-Polar was the last in a series of bloody Allied offensives against Communist forces in North Korea that took place August, September and October 1951.
Truce talks between Communist China, North Korea, South Korea and the United States began on July 10 of that year, but they broke down on August 23.
Allied Commander General Matthew Ridgway wanted to apply military pressure aimed at bringing the Communists back to the negotiation table.
Additionally, General James Van Fleet, Commander of the 8th Army, felt the potential for peace was softening his troops. A series of limited-offensive actions would keep them sharp and also provide combat-hardening for the many new replacement troops arriving in Korea.
Operation Nomad took place in the area south of Kumsong, in the central section of the Korean Peninsula, during the last half of October 1951. The battle began October 13th, two days before the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge ended.
Newspaper reports of this little-known operation drastically underplayed the reality of what happened, especially during the opening days of the offensive. History books, too, give only abbreviated nods – or no mention whatsoever – of Operation Nomad-Polar. Yet, it was one of the most brutal, and most costly, fights the US 24th Army Infantry Division endured during its historic tenure in Korea.
During the first week of October 1951, the 24th Division moved into IX Corps' Line WYOMING sector to relieve the 7th Infantry Division. Sandwiched between the 2nd ROK Division to the west and the 6th ROK Division to the east, the 24th ID's 5th Infantry Regiment (5th RCT) took positions on the left, the 21st Regiment was positioned in the center, and the 19th Regiment was placed on the right, next to the 6th ROK. Also attached to the American regiments was the Columbian Infantry Battalion.
On October 13, these Allied troops launched an aggressive push against deeply-embedded Chinese Communists. The objective was to push the Chinese off their fortified winter line and to also take the city of Kumsong, a supply center for Chinese troops. Between Kumsong and the Allied positions stood a series of forbidding mountains, including Hill 770, inside of which the Chinese Command Post was built to withstand the coming winter; it was a formidable fortress.
That summer, the Chinese had taken advantage of the suspension of truce talks to build elaborate tunnel, trench and bunker systems within these mountains. During air, mortar and artillery attacks, the enemy had merely to go underground to protect themselves. Emerging unharmed, they often attacked or counterattacked after the sun went down.
The terrain was steep, rocky and slippery with rubble. Command Reports euphemistically state the Communists exhibited "stubborn resistance" and "gave ground grudgingly." American survivors know the reality was a far more brutal. Allied troops became easy targets as they climbed upward under hails of gunfire, mortar and so many grenades it “looked like a flock of blackbirds coming over.”
Unlike the North Koreans, who fought for the very dirt beneath their feet, the Chinese focused on features that offered them strategic advantage. In the push and pull of battle, the Chinese would give up yardage in efforts of luring the Allies into untenable positions.
By each days’ end, many 24th ID platoons were left with only a handful of men still standing. By morning, they’d be back up to strength thanks to a "pipeline" of replacements running with the tap wide open.
The 24th Division reached Line NOMAD by 17 October, and the troops hoped for a chance to rest. But they were immediately assigned a new objective, Line POLAR, which they reached on 22 October. The Allies drove the Chinese some 10 miles from their winter fortifications and destroyed Kumsong, along with its rail/supply capabilities.
Operation Nomad-Polar was the last major Allied offensive of the Korean War. The cost was high: at least 1,784 American casualties in 10 days. Of these, 288 were killed in action, died of wounds, or were later declared dead. These figures do not include the many casualties in the following days and weeks, as the Chinese tried to regain their positions.
It must be noted that Communist Liaison officers agreed to resume truce talks with the Americans and South Koreans on October 22nd, the day the 24th Division reached Line Polar.
One must wonder why such a key battle would be underplayed and nearly vanquished from histories of the Korean War.
One possibly reason may be that “Operation Nomad” was not a term the Army shared with the press or even with the soldiers themselves. In fact, many or most veterans who survived the battle remember it only as the Big Fall Push. In contrast, journalists gave several battles labels that grabbed the public’s imagination, such as Bloody Ridge, the Punchbowl, Old Baldy, Iron Triangle and Heartbreak Ridge. Battles known for their hill numbers didn’t stick in people’s minds like the “titled” battles.
According to published statistics, the 24th Division averaged 175 American casualties per day during Operation Nomad-Polar. In comparison, a daily average of 113 casualties were sustained during the Battle of Heartbreak Ridge, and the Battle of Bloody Ridge averaged 146 casualties per day. The only battle more deadly than Operation Nomad during the fall push was Operation Commando, which averaged 294 casualties per day[1].
One must ask, why was there a seemingly deliberate attempt to downplay the realities of Operation Nomad-Polar in the early newspaper reports?
The problem could possibly be attributed to the inexperience of the journalist, who was in fact not a reporter, but an Associated Press photographer. The following is taken from the Associated Press story published across the country on Monday, 15 October 1951:
- AP photographer Bob Schulz reported from the front that American and South Korean foot soldiers made gains of 3,000 yards in the first four hours of their attack Monday.
- Schulz said that the gains of almost a mile and a half were made “against an astonishing lack of Chinese resistance.”
- In the assaulting forces were troops of the U. S. 24th Division, and the South Korean Second and Sixth Divisions.
- The lack of intense infantry fighting in this sector contrasted sharply with the recent raging battles on the Western and Eastern fronts. There, Chinese and Korean Reds contested every yard.
- AP photographer Robert H. Schulz reported from the Central front that Sunday’s gains on the approaches to Kumsong brought to nearly three miles the ground taken in the three-day push. Kumsong is a Red supply and staging depot area well protected by mountains some 30 miles north of Parallel 38.
- The Allied Force – the U. S. 24th Division and the Republic of Korea (ROK) Second and Sixth Divisions – has seized nineteen hills in the advance, two of the most important Sunday. One is 2,000 feet high.
- Schulz reported the most noteworthy aspect of the advance was the “only moderate” resistance from what are apparently unusually poor quality Chinese troops.
- Whether these teen-age and middle-age scrapings from the Chinese military barrel are the main defense of the Kumsong sector or whether they are only a forward screening forte remains to be seen.
Schulz did not report the 24th Division suffered some 750 casualties in those first three days. The public also was not told 115 of those casualties resulted in death. And, he certainly did not accurately portray the viciousness of the battle.
There is another, possibly related, factor to consider. During this time period, American journalists were frustrated and angry, because they were being denied access to facts surrounding ground fighting and truce negotiations. In his excellent account of the Korean War, Pulitzer Prize winning author John Toland writes:
- The fighting along the front continued to be bitter and inconclusive. On October 15, [1951] Heartbreak Ridge, just north of the Punchbowl, was finally secured – after 3,700 American casualties. On the Eighth Army left flank, Operation Commando reached its objective in four days but also with heavy losses. In the United States, the public responded in a poll, with two thirds describing the Korean conflict as “an utterly useless war.”
- While the liaison officers at Panmunjom were thrashing out an agreement, General Ridgway was attempting to pacify the correspondents. Hanson Baldwin of The New York Times protested that “embellished adjectives had replaced facts.” The military communique of World War II had been simple, often terse. In this war it had become “a grab bag of service claims, so-called ‘action’ verbs and descriptive phrases.” And the result was “all the more serious since censorship in Korea had been serious and often captious.”
- At a press conference on October 16, Ridgway acknowledged that “full and timely information” had not been supplied and promised “steps would be taken to correct the situation.” At the same time, it would be “bad faith” to release certain kinds of information. As for the fighting, Ridgway acknowledged that the situation from some standpoints “could readily be construed as a military stalemate. It all depends on how you look at it.” [2]
Whether “full and timely information” was being withheld for military – or for political – reasons remains unclear, at least to this writer.
What is clear is that the men of the 24th Division, along with the 2nd and 6th ROK Divisions, fought their hearts out, and they achieved their objectives with magnificence. Most certainly, participants in this relatively unknown battle were poorly honored by the media, overlooked by historians, and shamefully ignored when they arrived home after the war.
The Korean War may still be unfinished, but the Americans who fought in it most certainly won the battles.
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[1] Operation Nomad-Polar: 1,752 casualties 13 to 22 Oct 1951. Heartbreak Ridge: 3,745 casualties sustained between 13 Sep to 15 Oct 1951. Bloody Ridge: 2,772 casualties between 18 Aug to 5 Sep 1951. Operation Commando: 2,643 casualties, 3 to 9 Oct 1951. Taken from A Chronology of the Forgotten War’s remembered battles. www.vfw.org. As published in APG News. Aberdeen Proving Ground. 30 October, 2003: p 5.
[2] Toland John. In Mortal Combat: Korea 1950-1953. New York: William Morrow. 1991: pp 487-488.